

(the same between enemy and allied soldiers on the bank of the Mekong River directly opposite the downtown section of the city.)

Dispatches yesterday from the Rich Nui Pass area said 1,300 Cambodian infantrymen seized the heights after enemy forces had retreated, leaving behind the bodies of those killed in their bunkers. On the heights, the Cambodians raised their blue, red and white flag over the napalm-scarred chalet of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the former Chief of State now living in exile in Peking.

The Cambodian infantrymen had been stalled for four days at the entrance to the pass by an estimated 2,000 enemy soldiers entrenched in the Elephant Mountains flanking Route

Continued on Page 4, Column 6

## U.S. AND RUSSIANS REACH MOON PACT

Exchange of Rock Samples Starts New Cooperation

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN  
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Jan. 21—The United States and the Soviet Union agreed today to exchange moon samples as part of a wide-ranging accord on increasing space cooperation between the two countries.

A document signed by George W. Low, acting administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Mstislav V. Keldysh, president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, appeared to open the way to a significant expansion of joint Soviet-American space efforts.

The agreement underscored the belief that on specific issues the United States and the Soviet Union are able to make progress even though the overall political relations between the two powers are far from ideal.

Soviet and American officials said in a communiqué issued before the departure of the

Continued on Page 44, Column 1

NEW WEEKLY BIOGRAPHICAL SERVICE  
The New York Times Biographical Service  
Writer: The New York Times Library Services  
Box 11-480, 529 West 43d Street, New York, N. Y. 10036. ADVT.

## Senate Protests Grow

By TAD SZULC

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21—Legislation to ban the use of funds to "provide United States air or sea combat support for any military operations in Cambodia" was introduced in the House by 64 Democratic Representatives today as concern mounted in the new Congress over further American involvement in the Indochina war.

Earlier, Senators Frank Church, Democrat of Idaho, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, demanded that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee promptly hold hearings to determine whether the Nixon Administration had violated last year's legislative restrictions on direct use of American forces in Cambodia by ferrying South Vietnamese troops into battle in helicopters and otherwise supporting them and the Cambodians by air.

Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield of Montana, urged "even greater vigilance" by Congress regarding United States activities in Southeast Asia. He warned a Democratic caucus, "We meet at a time when the sounds of war in Indochina again grow ominous."

A new element in the contro-

Continued on Page 5, Column 1

The F.B.A., and opposition workers. Amid an exchange of threats, about 200 welfare workers, the possibility of the city might invoke the Taylor Law and impose pay deductions and further suspensions. The Social Services Employees Union, accusing the city of provocation, raised the possibility of a city-wide strike.

The clash was the aftermath of an order by Mayor Lindsay on Wednesday suspending those responsible for placing Mrs. Cecilia Hainsworth and her four children in the luxury hotel at a cost of \$152.64 for two days.

On Wednesday night, after only a day in the Waldorf-Astoria, Mrs. Hainsworth and her family were moved to the apartment.

The lawsuit, now being tried in State Supreme Court, was brought early last year by the Patrolmen's union. It was based on the union's contract with the city, a contract that the patrolmen assert stipulates that patrolmen will receive \$3 for every \$3.50 earned by police sergeants.

The lawsuit was brought after the sergeants received a raise, and the case was sent back for trial last week by the State Court of Appeals, in a decision that touched off a walkout by most of the city's 27,000 patrolmen.

Although the first overtures for a settlement immediately preceded the walkout by 85 per-

Continued on Page 24, Column 1

## Foreign Policy: Disquiet Over Intelligence Setup

Following is the fifth in a series of articles exploring the Nixon Administration's style in foreign policy:

By BENJAMIN WELLES  
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 21—President Nixon has become dissatisfied with the size, cost and loose coordination of the Government's worldwide intelligence operations.

According to members of his staff, he believes that the intelligence provided to help him formulate foreign policy, while occasionally excellent, is not good enough, day after day, to justify its share of the budget.

Mr. Nixon, it is said, has begun to decide for himself what the intelligence priorities must

Continued on Page 8, Column 1

## Richard B. Russell Dead Georgian Was Dean of

Special to The New York Times  
WASHINGTON, Jan. 21 — Richard B. Russell, one of the most powerful men in the Senate, died today at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, where he had been since Dec. 8. The center listed the cause of death as respiratory insufficiency, resulting from pulmonary deficiency. The Georgia Democrat, the senior member of the Senate, was 73 years old.

President Nixon and the Senator's colleagues issued statements mourning his death. The President said:

"With the death of Senator Richard Russell, America mourns the passing of one of her greatest sons. A quarter of a century ago, when I first came to the Congress of the United States, Richard Russell of Georgia was already a name that inspired a universal admiration and respect from legislative adversaries and allies alike. He possessed an unprecedented abundance, a rare blend of courage, character, vision and ability that moved him indisputably into the ranks of those giants who have served in the United States Senate."

Mike Mansfield, Democratic leader of the Senate, said that if Senator Russell had been from another part of the country, he would have been a

Bonadio, president of the American Federation of Labor and Industrial Organization. The management represented by Dunn, executive of Associated General of America, and executive director of the National Electrical Association.

Professor Dunn, ordered by union officials as the ke of the group, and will probably prove for whatever reached. A res

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# Foreign Policy: Nixon Dissatisfied With S

Continued From Page 1, Col. 3

foreign policy behind a veil of secrecy. Now the pendulum has swung.

The President and his aides are said to suspect widespread overlapping, duplication and considerable "boon-doggling" in the secrecy-shrouded intelligence "community."

In addition to the C.I.A., they include the intelligence arms of the Defense, State and Justice Departments and the Atomic Energy Commission. Together they spend \$3.5 billion a year on strategic intelligence about the Soviet Union, Communist China and other countries that might harm the nation's security.

When tactical intelligence in Vietnam and Germany and reconnaissance by overseas commands is included, the annual figure exceeds \$5-billion, experts say. The Defense Department spends more than 80 per cent of the total, or about \$4-billion, about \$2.5-billion of it on the strategic intelligence and the rest on tactical. It contributes at least 150,000 members of the intelligence staffs, which are estimated at 200,000 people.

Overseeing all the activities is the United States Intelligence Board, set up by secret order by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1953 to coordinate intelligence exchanges, decide collection priorities, assign collection tasks and help prepare what are known as national intelligence estimates.

The chairman of the board, who is the President's representative, is the Director of Central Intelligence, at present Richard Helms. The other members are Lieut. Gen. Donald V. Bennett, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Ray S. Cline, director of intelligence and research at the State Department; Vice Adm. Noel Gayler, head of the National Security Agency; Howard C. Brown Jr., an assistant general manager at the Atomic Energy Commission; and William C. Sullivan, a deputy director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Intelligence men are aware of the President's disquiet, but they say that until now—half-way through his term—he has never seriously sought to comprehend the vast, sprawling conglomeration of agencies. Nor, they say, has he decided how best to use their technical resources and personnel in effecting a restructuring of policy.

## Two Cases in Point

Administration use—albeit tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance planes to help police the Arab-Israeli conflict of last August is considered a case in point. Another was the intelligence collection in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.

formation base," an official commented. "We don't give our negotiators round figures—about 300 of this weapon. We get it down to the '234 here, here and here.' When our people sit down to negotiate with the Russians they know all about the Russian strategic threat to the U.S.—that's the way to negotiate."

Too much intelligence has its drawbacks, some sources say, for it whets the Administration's appetite. Speaking of Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national-security affairs, a Cabinet official observed: "Henry's impatient for facts."

## Estimates in New Form

In the last year Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger have ordered a revision in the national intelligence estimates, which are prepared by the C.I.A. after consultation with the other intelligence agencies. Some on future Soviet strategy have been ordered radically revised by Mr. Kissinger.

"Our knowledge of present Soviet capabilities allows Henry and others to criticize us for some sponginess about predicting future Soviet policy," an informed source conceded. "It's pretty hard to look down the road with the same certainty."

Part of the Administration's dissatisfaction with the output and organization of the intelligence community stems from the President's tidy mental habits and pressing budget problems; part comes from the intellectual acuity of Mr. Kissinger, a counterintelligence sergeant in World War II and a specialist on Soviet strategy and on disarmament.

On the other hand, the Administration recognizes that it must share the blame for not having come to grips with intelligence problems until now.

The President is said to have had difficulty ascertaining precisely what all the Federal intelligence agencies do — and with how much money and manpower.

"Trying to draw up an organization chart is a nightmare," a senior aide remarked. "No one person seems to be in charge. That's part of the problem. Whoever winds up running this thing is clearly going to have to be someone with the President's confidence."

The intelligence units have their own problems in figuring out the White House's mode of operation. Recently an intelligence unit in the Pentagon spent a good deal of time and effort in trying to determine what functions each member of Mr. Kissinger's 110-man staff was supposed to perform.

## Helms Said to Hate It

Sources close to the White House say that Mr. Nixon and his foreign-policy advisers — Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers — have been "jeopardized" by the "confusion" between the intelligence agencies.

## The 49 Committee

Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, U. A. Johnson

Atomic Energy Commission  
Howard Brown  
Asst. Gen. Mgr.

Bureau of Intelligence Research  
Director, Ray S. Cline

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
Headed by President Nixon

U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Chairman, Richard H. Helms  
Director of Central Intelligence and head of Central Intelligence Agency

Central Intelligence Agency  
Lieut. Gen. R. E. Cushman Jr., Deputy Dir.

G-2 (Army Intelligence) Office of Intelligence

U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: Six groups comprising intelligence directors or deputies shown on chart. The forty committee serves

about 1,200 intelligence officers and now it has 300. Its annual intelligence budget is \$3-million, or 0.25 per cent of spending on intelligence. Recently Mr. Rogers has directed Mr. Cline to take a more vigorous part at Intelligence Board meetings, asserting the department's "primacy" in foreign policy, and specifically in intelligence collection and evaluation.

Mr. Nixon is said to feel the need to settle the question of ultimate leadership but to be willing to wait until the study he ordered is completed.

Mr. Helms's control over intelligence activities is indirect and his powers are circumscribed. He is an adviser on intelligence, not on policy. He points out the likely consequences from policy acts but he does not recommend policies unless specifically asked to by the President.

Moreover, the director, like other intelligence chiefs in the Federal bureaucracy, must "sell" his product to Cabinet-level consumers and get decisions.

"Helms has been trying awfully hard to stay out of trouble," remarked a former agency official with White House contacts. "He's had the feeling that the White House was a place that might become a focal point of trouble in this Administration, and his policy has been very cautious."

His associates also fear that his usefulness as an intelligence adviser will be jeopardized if the "confusion" between the intelligence agencies is not cleared up.

Egyptians to continue introducing missile batteries into the standstill area after the deadline, infuriating Israel, threatening the cease-fire and embarrassing the White House.

## Administration Embarrassed

Faulty coordination prior to the abortive Sontag raid also embarrassed the Administration. There is evidence that the C.I.A., at Mr. Helms's direction, furnished the Pentagon with what information it had on North Vietnam during the early planning stages last summer. However, the Pentagon took over the planning. What went wrong is still a mystery.

Rapid intelligence, specialists insist, can afford protection to policy interests.

Before dawn on Jan. 23, 1968, President Johnson was awakened to learn that the U.S.S. Pueblo, an electronic intelligence ship carrying vital code-breaking devices, had been seized by North Korean gunboats. His immediate reaction was to order an attack on North Korea to free the ship.

C.I.A. analysts in the White House situation room warned him that the North Koreans had 450 jets and 15 surface-to-air missile batteries. They reported that a North Korean broadcast just intercepted stated that the Pueblo had solved 23 miles of the code.

With that information, Johnson decided to risk a "surgical" attack on the ship.

States is an "ident," Brainerd White is not long ago. A President choose to not resources at not. Whatever are substantiated. The C.I.A. arm, escorted the national security. As is the case, the adviser to Congress.

## For a Long Time


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NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, JANUARY 22, 1971

# Satisfied With Size and Cost of Intelligence Service



The New York Times/Andrew Subbitt

Jan. 22, 1971

UNITY: Six groups comprising Intelligence Board are represented at its meetings by the on chart. The forty committee screens proposals for the President.

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With that information Mr. Johnson decided against the risk of a second war on the Asian mainland and took the issue of "piracy on the high seas" to the United Nations.

"In the missile age, the most dangerous enemy of the United

States is an uninformed President," Bromley Smith, a former White House aide, wrote not long ago.

A President, of course, may choose to use the intelligence resources at his command or not. Whatever he chooses they are substantial.

The C.I.A. is the "central" arm, created under the National Security Act of 1949, to coordinate all overseas intelligence activities and to winnow for the President intelligence, from whatever source, affecting national security. As its leader, Mr. Helms is the senior intelligence adviser to the President and Congress.

The agency can conduct espionage anywhere outside the United States. It has no powers of arrest and interrogation but cooperates with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Congress has empowered the agency to perform services of "common concern" to other branches of government as ordered by the National Security Council. That is its charter for "action actions": flying U-2's over the Soviet Union from 1956 to 1960; ferrying agents in and out of enemy-held areas of Southeast Asia; or training and supplying anti-Communist Meo fighters in Laos, where President John F. Kennedy ordered it in 1962.

Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State, once told a group of "Dirty tricks form about a per-

cent of the C.I.A.'s work—and we have full control over dirty tricks."

Proposals for covert actions come from the White House, the State, Defense or Justice Department and from ambassadors and military commanders overseas. All must eventually be approved by a little-known White House panel whose designation is periodically switched for cover purposes.

Known at present as the Forty Committee, for the number of the memo constituting it, it consists of Mr. Helms, Attorney General John N. Mitchell, Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard, Mr. Kissinger and U. Alexis Johnson,

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. If all agree on a proposal it goes forward; if not the President decides.

On the west side the C.I.A. employs several thousand social and physical scientists to study the flood of information pouring in daily—half from open sources, a third from satellites and telemetry and 10 to 15 per cent from spies.

The other agencies, notably those at the Pentagon, have less developed evaluation facilities but far greater collection tools. The Pentagon is authorized to run its own agents abroad after clearance from the C.I.A. Mr. Helms is said to have little control over its activities.

The Administration has also been embarrassed by recent disclosures that Army intelligence, assigned by the Johnson Administration to spy on civilians during civil disturbances starting in the summer of 1967, virtually ran wild and by late 1969 had fed 18,000 names into its computers, dossiers and files.

Neither Mr. Helms nor the Intelligence Board had any connection with this domestic counterespionage. It was an example of overlarge staffs using excessive facilities under too little civilian control.

The Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency has a staff of 3,000 and spends \$500-million yearly—as much as the C.I.A.—to collect and evaluate strategic intelligence.

It uses Air Force planes to monitor foreign nuclear tests and collect air samples. Its National Security Agency at Fort Meade, near Baltimore, spends \$1-billion yearly and employs nearly 100,000 cryptanalysts and supporting staff to crack codes and eavesdrop on world communications. Its National Reconnaissance Office spends another \$1-billion yearly flying reconnaissance airplanes and lofting or exploiting the

satellites that scan the earth and relay enemy terrain with accuracy from 100 miles.

The results of the coming management main to be seen of Secretary Laird's report to him in the Joint Chiefs of Staff an Assistant Secretary, Robert F. F. expected in time the Pentagon's machinery control and to sit the Pentagon's main meeting of the Board.

Many intelligence code the need for the "fat," tightening nation, making more responsive to the mulation of foreign. Some, citing successes since World War little change beyond ing and tampering."

Others feel that house" reorganization tinct from an outstudded with politicians but substantive people, may and may strengthen Helms's guidance of intelligence community.

Whatever the many career experts: United States system markedly superior to pal rivals in the Soviet

One official, asked action to the comit quoted Cardinal M. 18th-century French who was elected Academy but then certain dignities he c his due.

"When I look at am nothing," the Cai marked, "but when I the others I am great

Tomorrow: Congress the Administration

## ARNOLD CONSTABLE 5TH AVENUE

### THE MOST UNUSUAL MINK FUR SALE IN OUR ENTIRE 145 YEAR HISTORY

Because - a famous furrier was forced to go out of business  
Because - we offered cash at once for his entire mink coat stock  
Because - we bought the finest, most magnificent mink furs



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Manufacturing Furriers  
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
Arnold Constable Corporation  
453 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Attn: Mr. Jules Rabinowitz, Fur Buyer


Gentlemen

After 145 Years in Business, Our Fur Coats are the Best

## and Cost of Intelligence Setup



Federal Bureau of Investigation  
William C. Sullivan,  
Deputy dir.



National Security Agency  
Director,  
William A. Mohr

(Air  
gence)

es/Andrew Sabbelini Jan. 22, 1971  
nited at its meetings by the  
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spends another \$1-billion yearly  
flying reconnaissance airplanes  
and lofting or exploiting the

satellites that constantly circle  
the earth and photograph en-  
emy terrain with incredible  
accuracy from 130 miles up.

The results of the President's  
coming management survey re-  
main to be seen of course, but  
Secretary Laird has already  
ordered General Bennett to  
report to him instead of to the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover,  
an Assistant Secretary of De-  
fense, Robert F. Froehke, is  
expected in time to take all  
the Pentagon's massive intel-  
ligence machinery under his  
control and to sit in as the  
Pentagon's main representa-  
tive at Mr. Helms's weekly  
meeting of the Intelligence  
Board.

Many intelligence men con-  
cede the need for "trimming  
the fat," tightening up co-ordi-  
nation, making intelligence  
more responsive to the for-  
mulation of foreign policy.  
Some, citing successive stud-  
ies since World War II, see  
little change beyond "tinker-  
ing and tampering."

Others feel that an "in-  
house" reorganization, as dis-  
tinct from an outside panel  
studded with politically promi-  
nent but substantively inef-  
fective people, may do good  
and may strengthen Mr.  
Helms's guidance of the in-  
telligence community.

Whatever the outcome,  
many career experts regard the  
United States system as still  
markedly superior to its prin-  
cipal rivals in the Soviet Union.

One official, asked his re-  
action to the coming study,  
quoted Cardinal Maury, an  
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Tomorrow: Congress and  
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Parco Fur, Inc.

Manufacturing Furriers  
250 WEST 20TH ST. NEW YORK, N.Y. 10011

Arnold Constable Corporation  
453 Fifth Avenue  
New York, N.Y. 10016

Attn: Mr. Peter H. H. H.

Gentlemen

Administration use—albeit tardy use—of vast resources in spy satellites and reconnaissance. Arab-Israeli cease-fire of last August is considered a case in point. Another was poor intelligence coordination before the abortive Sontay prisoner-of-war raid of No. 21, at which time the C.I.A. was virtually shut out of Pentagon planning.

By contrast, the specialists point out, timely intelligence helps in decision-making.

It was Mr. Cline who spotted in U-2 photographs a sign of a Soviet nuclear submarine buildup at Cienfuegos, Cuba, last September. His suspicions, based on the arrival of a mother ship, plus two inconspicuous barges of a type used only for storing a nuclear submarine's radioactive effluent, alerted the White House. That led to intense behind-the-scenes negotiation and the President's recent warning to Moscow not to service nuclear armed ships "in or from" Cuban bases.

Career officials in the intelligence community resist talking with reporters, but interviews over several months with Federal officials who deal daily with intelligence matters, with men retired from intelligence careers and with some on active duty indicate that President Nixon and his chief advisers appreciate the need for high-grade intelligence and "consume" it eagerly.

The community, for instance, has been providing the President with exact statistics on numbers, deployment and characteristics of Soviet missiles, nuclear submarines and airpower for the talks with the Russians on the limitation of strategic arms.

"We couldn't get off the ground at the talks without this extremely sophisticated in-

#### Helms Said to Rate High

Sources close to the White House and his foreign-policy advisers—Mr. Kissinger and Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird—respect the professional competence of Mr. Helms, who is 52 and is the first career head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson in June, 1963, Mr. Helms has been essentially apolitical. He is said to have brought professional ability to bear in "lowering the profile" of the agency, tightening discipline and divesting it of many fringe activities that have aroused criticism in Congress and among the public. His standing with Congress and among the professionals is high.

According to White House sources, President Nixon, backed by the Congressional leadership, recently offered Mr. Helms added authority to coordinate the activities of the other board members. He is reported to have declined.

A major problem, according to those who know the situation, is that while Mr. Helms is the President's representative on the Intelligence Board, his agency spends only about 10 per cent—\$500-million to \$600-million—of the annual intelligence budget. It employs about 150,000 Americans, plus a few thousand foreigners.

"When you have the authority but you don't control the resources," a senior Pentagon official explained, "you tend to walk very softly."

As for the State Department, which has constitutional responsibility for foreign policy, it has seen its intelligence arm gradually whittled away; in 1945 it had

#### Bearer of Bad Tidings

In addition the C.I.A. must sometimes report facts that the Administration is loath to hear—as happened last May when it told the White House, State Department and Pentagon that Vietnamese Communists had infiltrated more than 30,000 agents into the South Vietnamese Government, endangering its ability to last after an American troop withdrawal.

The slack use of the intelligence community's resources during the Middle East crisis last year illustrates a problem bothering the White House.

On June 19 Mr. Rogers urged a cease-fire; it was accepted by the Egyptians on July 22 and by the Israelis on Aug. 1. All parties agreed that it would take effect at midnight Israeli time on the seventh.

According to sources in and out of the intelligence community, Mr. Rogers and his principal deputy on the matter, Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, were unwilling to consider the possibility of violations. It was not until Aug. 10 or 11 that the first U-2's began flying from British bases on Cyprus. Even then there were problems. Weather delayed the first photographic activity—even by the United States—over her territory. The delays permitted the